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The End of Grand Strategy: US Maritime Opera-
tions in the Twenty-First Century, by Simon Reich 
and Peter Dombrowski� Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ� 
Press, 2017� 252 pages� $30�
As Hal Brands wrote in his 2014 work 
What Good Is Strategy? (Cornell Univ� 
Press), grand strategy is “very much 
in vogue these days” (p� vii)� In the 
broadest sense, it is a quest to find some 
semblance of order in the intricately 
complex security environment� The 
more disorderly the global security 
system, the more expansive the change 
under way in this system; and the 
more fragile the domestic consensus 
on national priorities, the greater the 
need for some sort of unifying and 
guiding strategy� That is why Americans 
desperately are seeking one now�
Even though the body of scholarly 
literature on grand strategy is large and 
growing, in The End of Grand Strategy 
Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski 
have made an original, provocative, 
and contrarian contribution, arguing 
that Americans are inclined toward 
a “one-size-fits-all” grand strategy 
based on global primacy that has “little 
utility in the twenty-first century” (p� 
2)� Primacy, Reich and Dombrowski 
believe, “has become the default option 
of American academics and policy mak-
ers who deliberate over grand strategy” 
(p� 41)� This option leads to two major 
problems: primacy is no longer feasible 
for the United States, and the actual 
application of American power, par-
ticularly military power, does not reflect 
the grand strategy on which Reich and 
Dombrowski feel that it is based�
The authors advocate abandoning 
the “one-size-fits-all primacist” grand 
strategy and using a flexible array of six 
strategies: primacist-hegemony, leader-
ship / cooperative security / unilateral 
hegemony, formal sponsorship, informal 
sponsorship, isolationist retrenchment, 
and restrained retrenchment� Reich 
and Dombrowski then provide six 
maritime case studies to illustrate that 
the United States already is using this 
array of strategies even while claiming 
to use a unitary one-size-fits-all one�
This argument makes sense if—and 
only if—the authors’ conceptualization 
of grand strategy is accurate� But has 
anyone outside the academy ever 
claimed that there is a discernible, 
unitary American grand strategy that 
dictates the application of national 
power? The authors write: “By defini-
tion, the architectural design of any 
single, abstract strategy is relatively 
rigid if not indeed static—intellectually, 
conceptually, analytically, and organi-
zationally” (pp� 167–68)� But outside 
the academy, there is no “single, 
abstract” U�S� grand strategy� There 
never has been and never will be�
A case can be made that what Reich 
and Dombrowski are describing is 
the natural and enduring distinction 
between theoretical grand strategies, 
which often strive for logical consistency 
and internal coherence, and applied 
strategy� Just as no military operation 
ever perfectly reflects the operational 
plan behind it, there never is perfect 
congruity between a theoretical grand 
strategy and the practice of strategy� 
That is the reason that the grand strate-
gic guidelines that the U�S� government 
uses to guide its action—particularly 
the congressionally mandated National 
Security Strategy documents—do not 
constitute coherent, logically consistent 
grand strategies for a theorist or scholar�
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In practice, American political leaders 
use the national grand strategy, be it pri-
macy or something else, as a shorthand 
way of explaining the complex security 
environment to the public and its elected 
representatives, and as a very broad and 
pliable set of historically derived best 
practices and aspirations� No policy 
maker ever made a decision and no mili-
tary leader ever crafted a theater strategy 
or operational plan because it was what 
the grand strategy demanded� As John 
Gaddis phrased it in On Grand Strategy 
(Penguin Random House, 2018), grand 
strategy is simply “the alignment of 
potentially unlimited aspirations with 
necessarily limited capabilities” (p� 21)� 
It is a constantly shifting web of patterns 
and habits blending both aspirations 
and predilections, a creed, even a myth, 
and not something prescriptive, such 
as a legal code� Outright dissonance 
between its theory and its practice 
would be worrisome, but some level of 
incongruity is normal, even inevitable�
While theorists of grand strategy talk 
of primacy, in reality the United States 
is focused more on maintaining the 
system it created rather than trying to 
dominate it� Thus the configuration of 
the U�S� military, which is derived from 
a practice of reasonably being prepared 
for low-probability/high-risk threats 
such as major war, while devoting most 
of its effort to system-maintenance 
missions, makes sense� Ultimately, Reich 
and Dombrowski’s contention that the 
United States is at the end of grand strat-
egy does not stand up if grand strategy 
is conceptualized as a set of if/then state-
ments or rules of thumb, as a shorthand 
way of communicating and building 
consensus rather than official writ�
That said, The End of Grand Strategy is 
a challenging, erudite, and worthwhile 
read� It is unusual in its use of sea 
power to illustrate its points� It is 
right about the enduring centrality 
of American naval power� It is right 
that a “new” grand strategy is not the 
solution to America’s security problems� 
However, to borrow from Mark Twain, 
the authors’ report of the death of grand 
strategy may be an exaggeration�
STEVEN METZ
Hell on Earth, by Avigdor Hameiri, trans� Peter 
C� Appelbaum� Detroit, MI: Wayne State Univ� 
Press, 2017� 478 pages� $39�99�
War memoirs and war literature 
frequently intersect� Because of the 
traumas and tragedies of war and the 
impact they have on individuals, it is 
not uncommon for authors to write 
of their experiences of war using 
fiction to give voice to both literary 
creativity and personal experience� Karl 
Marlantes’s powerful novel Matterhorn 
(Grove, 2010) is one example, written 
about his experience of the Vietnam 
War as a Marine officer� So also are 
the writings of Israeli author Avigdor 
Hameiri (1890–1970) a reflection of the 
author’s experience of an earlier war�
Born in the village of Odavidhaza, 
in Carpathian Ruthenia in Austria-
Hungary (near present-day Mukacheve, 
western Ukraine), Hameiri fought 
in World War I as a soldier in the 
Austro-Hungarian army and recounted 
his experiences in two fictionalized 
memoirs, The Great Madness (1929; 
translation published by Vantage, 1952) 
and Hell on Earth (original-language 
publication, 1932)� The former recounts 
experiences of a Jewish soldier on 
the eastern front, while the latter, the 
translation of which is the subject of this 
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